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    Abstract.  There has been considerable debate over 
whether Georgia should create a market for water 
withdrawal permits.  In areas where the Georgia 
Environmental Protection Division (EPD) has imposed a 
moratorium on new withdrawal permits, a mechanism for 
water rights transfers could enable reallocation of water to 
higher valued uses.  Water market proponents argue that 
under existing law Georgia lacks the tools to efficiently 
reallocate water and sustain continued economic growth.  
Opponents argue that a market is an inappropriate way for 
Georgia to introduce economic incentives into water 
management.  But if not a water market, then what? 
    This Paper presents a range of water reallocation 
mechanisms and argues that water supply solutions should 
be tailored to meet specific problems and objectives.  Such 
an approach emphasizes the need for regional planning 
and management and a clearly developed interbasin 
transfer policy as part of the comprehensive statewide 
water management plan.  Georgia would be best served by 
moving cautiously in introducing any new system for 





    The recent dispute over water marketing highlighted 
one of the as yet unsolved problems of a water permit 
allocation system:  reallocation to higher valued uses 
when additional supply is no longer available.   Because 
permits are allocated to new users as uses arise—in effect, 
a first come first serve basis—the initial allocation is 
unlikely to be optimal in the long run.   As long as 
additional water capacity remains available, the 
administering agency can continue to issue permits to new 
users, and conflicts will not develop.  This approach has 
worked well for Eastern states in general, where until 
recently, supply almost always exceeded demand 
(Dellapenna, 2001).  
    Once the resource becomes fully allocated, as it may 
already be in parts of Georgia, there will be a need to 
reallocate water rights to the highest valued uses in order 
to obtain the most efficient use of a scare resource.  In 
Eastern permit states, however, there is usually no 
mechanism for existing permits to be transferred to other 
uses in situations where additional permits can no longer 
be issued.   While this problem in Georgia may have been 
partly solved by the end of the drought in 2003, continued 
growth throughout the state, and in Eastern states in 
general, will make this a recurring issue.  
    Too often, the debate has been framed as a dichotomous 
choice between either having a water market or not having 
a water market.   This Paper argues that this is an 
improper lens through which to view the issue, because 
there are a range of institutional mechanisms for 
facilitating reallocation.  Georgia must identify problems 
and consider mechanisms in light of specific regional 
supply objectives.  Such an approach underscores the need 





    After a water resource is fully allocated, existing uses 
must be reduced before allocation to new users can occur.  
Since a user will not voluntarily surrender a valuable 
permit without incentive to do so, there are three basic 
ways to accomplish the surrender of an existing permit.  
First, the state agency could impose an involuntary 
reduction on a water user, by either revoking the permit or 
modifying the withdrawal capacity.  Second, a new permit 
applicant could provide an incentive for an existing permit 
holder to voluntarily surrender the permit or reduce 
withdrawal.  Third, the state could provide an incentive to 
the user to reduce withdrawal for the purpose of reissuing 
that water capacity to someone else. 
  
I. Reallocation by the Administering Agency 
 Georgia law already provides EPD—the state’s 
administering agency—with limited authority to free up 
water for reallocation among permit holders or to new 
applicants.  There are three possible mechanisms under 
the current statutes:  nonrenewal, revocation for nonuse, 
and modification of existing permits.  One major 
impediment to the effective use of these procedures is the 
exemption of farm uses from many of the relevant 
provisions in the statutes.  Additionally, EPD must be 
careful not to engage in overly aggressive regulatory 




    Nonrenewal.  First, EPD can reallocate water supply by 
declining to renew existing permits upon expiry, thereby 
increasing available water capacity for subsequent 
reallocation to new permit applicants.   EPD has discretion 
to decline to renew a permit application based on the same 
criteria for issuing new permits (O.C.G.A. §§ 12-5-31(j), 
97(b)).   If EPD determines that a proposed use is more 
necessary or beneficial than an existing use, EPD has 
implied authority to reallocate the water capacity to a new 
user. 
 
    Revocation for Nonuse.  Second, EPD has authority to 
revoke non-farm permits for nonuse by the permittee 
(O.C.G.A. §§ 12-5-31(k), 96(c)).   In theory, revocation of 
such permits would free up permit capacity for 
reallocation to new users.  Any new allocation, however, 
must be dependent upon stream flow and hydrologic 
capacity.  To the extent that EPD estimates total 
withdrawals based on acreage under irrigation, allowing 
revocation of unused farm permits would take acres out of 
irrigation estimates.   This would enable EPD to determine 
with increased certainty the maximum permitted capacity 
and to issue new permits if capacity is available (DNR, 
2001). 
 
    Modification.  Third, EPD has authority to modify 
existing permits in order to free up water for reallocation 
to new uses.  Georgia law goes further than other Eastern 
states in this regard.   The Georgia Code states, “The 
director may suspend or modify...a permit if he should 
determine that the quantity of water allowed under the 
permit is greater than that needed...for the particular use or 
would prevent other applicants from reasonable use of 
surface waters....” (O.C.G.A. § 12-5-31(k))   When two 
“users or applicants qualify equally,” the director has 
authority to modify existing permits on a “prorated or 
other reasonable basis” (O.C.G.A. § 12-5-31(f)).  It is 
significant that the statute refers to “applicants” in 
addition to users, because this authorizes EPD to modify 
permits not only to protect current uses but also to allow 
new uses. 
 
    Limitations.  There are a number of practical problems 
that limit the effectiveness of these agency tools.  First, 
farm permits are exempt from the renewal process, cannot 
be revoked for nonuse, and are mostly exempt from 
modification.  Second, EPD operates with minimal 
funding, which is a major limitation on the ability of the 
agency to provide adequate regulatory oversight.   If EPD 
were to take a more active role in reallocation through its 
existing regulatory powers, it would need additional 
resources to perform effectively (DNR, 2001).  Third, 
effective agency action would require more precise 
knowledge of usage if EPD is to revoke permits for 
nonuse or reduce permits for waste. 
    There are also larger institutional problems with relying 
on these methods if extensive reallocation is necessary.  
While revocation of a permit after an extended period of 
nonuse is good management policy, forced transfers 
brought about by arbitrary or excessive permit 
modification would threaten economic growth by creating 
investment insecurity and inhibiting long-term planning 
by water users (Dellapenna, 2001).  While pursuing a 
policy of revocation for nonuse or waste, the state must be 
careful not to act in ways that unfairly burden productive 
holders of water rights. 
 
II. Reallocation Through Private Incentives 
    The primary mechanism for voluntary transfers of water 
rights between users is a market.  A water market can take 
various forms, depending upon the conditions on transfers 
and the role of the administering agency.  The primary 
problem with water markets is that high transaction costs 
and externalities may result in either inefficient or socially 
undesirable transfers. 
    Regulation of a water market is essential to protect third 
parties and the public interest from the externalities of 
individual transfers.  Any change in the location, time, 
duration, or character of a use has the potential to impact 
other water users.  A transfer from a less consumptive use 
to a more consumptive use will cause a net loss of water 
from the hydrologic system.  A sale of a water right that 
involves an interbasin transfer removes water from the 
transferor basin and adds water to the transferee basin, 
with the potential for adverse effects in both basins.  
These external effects will not be taken into consideration 
by the transacting parties, and if the externality is greater 
than the gains to the transacting parties, then the sale will 
result in a net societal loss. 
    If Georgia is to consider market mechanisms for 
reallocation of water rights, the state must impose 
limitations on transfers that are sufficient to protect the 
public interest.  First, the state must ensure that property 
rights in water remain usufructory rights, so that the state 
maintains authority to manage water resources and 
prevent export.  Second, the state must adopt an 
appropriate set of standards for approving transfers.  
Third, to prevent an increase in total usage, water rights 
must be adequately quantified prior to transfers.  
Quantification should include not only a maximum 
amount per day, but also the seasonality of the use and the 
consumptive nature of the use.  Fourth, the state must 
adopt a comprehensive strategy for monitoring and 
limiting interbasin transfers.  Fifth, any system of 
reallocation should be open to the public, so that third 
parties potentially affected by transfers can seek review.   
    Such protections are necessary to ensure that the 
externalities of transfers do not outweigh the economic 
gains from trade.  But providing such protection to third 
parties and the public interest increases transactions costs 
 
and decreases the efficiency of a market.  Therefore, 
despite the claims of some market proponents that market 
transfers are a panacea for reallocation issues, high 
transaction costs are often a barrier to efficient 
reallocation through a market system. 
 
III. Reallocation Through State-Based Incentives 
    A third basic mechanism for initiating reallocation of 
water rights is through incentives generated by the state.  
The highly praised 1991 California Drought Emergency 
Water Bank provides the most direct example of such 
incentives.  As an emergency response to a five-year 
drought, the California Department of Water Resources 
purchased 820,000 acre-feet of water from farmers in the 
north and resold it to urban water providers in the south.  
The transfers were temporary and were prioritized based 
on “critical need.”  The advantages of using state-brokered 
transactions to reallocate were the reduction in transaction 
costs and the coordination of transfers with other water 
movements in the state.  Due to emergency conditions, 
however, no environmental impacts reports were required, 
and state agencies provided almost blanket approval to 
transfers without consideration for third-party effects.  
Additional concerns arose with respect to economic 
impacts in the transferor regions.  Overall, however, the 
1991 Water Bank was considered a successful emergency 
policy response to severe drought conditions (Israel & 
Lund, 1995). 
    The Flint River Drought Protection Act offers a 
precedent for state-based incentives for water rights 
modifications in Georgia (O.C.G.A. §§ 12-5-540 to 550).  
The Act created an economic incentive program to reduce 
withdrawals for the purpose of maintaining minimum in-
stream flow in the Flint River during drought years.  
Using funds from the state’s tobacco settlement money, a 
2001 auction reduced surface water irrigation on 33,101 
acres.  In its current form, the Act merely decreases water 
usage among existing users and has no provisions for 
transferring or reallocating water to new uses.  It could, 
however, signal a willingness by Georgia to consider 
state-based incentives to influence allocation. 
    Tax incentives and user fees are other examples of 
government incentives designed to change patterns of 
water use.  In Georgia, such tools might be used to help 
solve the problem of unused permits.  Rather than 
revoking such permits for nonuse, it may be cheaper and 
easier to recover these permits if the state were to offer a 
tax incentive to permit holders who returned excess 
capacity to the state.  Nonusers would have a financial 
incentive to surrender their permits to the state, and actual 
users would have an incentive to take advantage of cost 
effective conservation methods.   
    Such incentives would be strengthened by providing a 
fixed period in which the tax savings could be realized by 
voluntarily surrendering unused permits, followed by a 
period in which EPD would begin to revoke permits for 
nonuse administratively.  This would provide permit 
holders with a window in which to realize a benefit from 
turning over a permit, after which the unused permit could 
be revoked without compensation.  Given the vital need to 
bring unused permits back into the system, a system of tax 
incentives, as compared to administrative revocation, 
would be better for farmers and may be more cost 





    Georgia must improve its water management system 
before instituting mechanisms for transfers or reallocation.  
First, the state must improve its existing structure of water 
management by implementing a comprehensive statewide 
water management plan that better coordinates existing 
law and administration and improves knowledge about 
current usage and supply.  Second, the state should only 
introduce new means for reallocation in light of specific 
problems and clearly defined objectives.  Any new 
institutions should be narrowly crafted to meet those 
objectives.  Such an approach underscores the need for 
regional planning and management in meeting supply 
needs. 
 
1. Develop a Comprehensive Statewide Water 
Management Plan   
    Prior to considering mechanisms for reallocation, the 
state should develop and implement a comprehensive 
statewide water management plan.  Under this plan, 
Georgia should begin to manage surface water and 
groundwater conjunctively and develop sustainable usage 
plans for each region of the state.  Ideally, the legislature 
would provide additional funding to EPD to improve its 
oversight of water resources. 
    Georgia should attempt to bring farm withdrawals fully 
within the permit system.  First, the state should introduce 
provisions for forfeiture for nonuse of farm permits (DNR, 
2001).  To account for periodic crop rotation in 
agriculture, it may be appropriate to impose less stringent 
conditions for forfeiture on farm permits than the two 
years provided to non-farm uses.  In general, however, 
permits that are unused for lengthy periods of time should 
be surrendered to the state.  Second, all permits should 
have specific quantity and duration limitations.  These 
requirements will clarify water rights and bring farm 
permits in line with municipal and industrial permits. 
    It is also imperative that Georgia improve its knowledge 
of usage and supply before considering mechanisms for 
reallocation.  Accurate and reliable information on water 
use and supply is needed to help understand the scope of 
specific supply problems.  Georgia must determine how 
much water is being used and how much should remain in 
 
the rivers and aquifers before making drastic changes to 
the law of water allocation. 
 
2. Clearly Define Reallocation Problems and 
Objectives. 
    Institutions for water rights transfers should be 
considered only after identifying regional water supply 
problems.  Recent water market proposals were designed 
specifically to address the problems of the Flint River 
Basin, but the legislation introduced in 2003 would have 
enacted one market system for the entire state without 
consideration for the differing conditions in each region.  
In addition, the 2003 legislation was disjointed from the 
problem, because it proposed permanent transferability as 
a solution to a temporary moratorium on new permits.  
    In the future, discussions on transfer mechanisms 
should consider specific problems on a regional basis.  In 
additional to increasing knowledge gaps about supply and 
current usage, the state must also decide what it hopes to 
achieve through transfers.  Who needs additional water 
supply?  Who is offering to cut usage to give up water that 
is currently allocated and in use?  How much reallocation 
is necessary?  Is there a need for reallocation between 
similar uses or between different types of uses?  Is there a 
need for reallocation within a narrowly defined hydrologic 
distance, or a demand for increased interbasin transfers?  
The scope of regional reallocation objectives should 
dictate the discussion of the mechanisms available as an 
appropriate solution. 
 
3.  Consider Mechanisms in Light of Objectives. 
    Unlike arid Western states, Georgia is blessed with 
abundant rainfall, which may give the state more options 
in meeting water supply needs.  Many supply problems 
may be solved through conservation and better 
management, and bringing farm uses fully within the 
permit system will improve the effectiveness of existing 
regulatory tools.  Where possible, the state should seek to 
meet supply objectives without introducing new 
mechanisms for transferability. 
    If water supply objectives call for reallocation within 
agriculture and within a narrowly defined hydrologic 
distance—farmer-to-farmer transfers within a single river 
basin—then a limited mechanism for voluntary 
transferability may be an appropriate solution for 
reallocating existing supply.  Under such circumstances, 
transferability is less problematic, because the type of use 
remains the same with only a reasonable change in 
location of use.  If transactions are adequately monitored 
by EPD, some form of voluntary transferability could 
possibly enable potential gains from trade with 
manageable transactions costs and externalities.  Where 
reallocation is in response to short term drought 
conditions, allowing temporary transfers or leasing of 
water rights may be more appropriate than permanent 
transfers. 
    Reallocation between different types of uses must be 
more strictly regulated.  Reallocation that involves a 
change in usage introduces new variables into the 
transaction, increasing transaction costs and potential 
externalities.  A change from a less consumptive use to a 
more consumptive use will, by definition, consume more 
water even if the amount diverted remains constant.  
Seasonality of use is potentially problematic for transfers 
out of agriculture, because while agricultural irrigation 
occurs mostly in summer months, municipal or industrial 
use continues year-round.  In addition, large scale 
transfers out of agriculture could have negative economic 
impacts on rural communities that depend on farm 
economies (Israel & Lund, 1995).  While these added 
complications of inter-sector transfers do not mean that 
such reallocation should not occur, they do suggest that a 
more active state role is required to ensure that such 
transfers do not have adverse impacts on water resources 
and local communities.  A market with minimal regulation 
is probably not sufficient for managing such transfers. 
    Reallocation that involves an interbasin transfer of 
water is an even more problematic type of transfer.  While 
interbasin transfers may be necessary in certain 
circumstances, an effective management policy would 
limit movement of water between basins whenever 
possible.  Such transfers must involve a high degree of 
administrative oversight.  Unregulated market transfers 
between private parties that also involve interbasin 
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